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Forcing the Federal Hand: Reserved




Since the late nineteenth century, the existence of federal water
rights on federally reserved lands has caused considerable controversy.
Conflicts are particularly acute in the semiarid West, where the holdings
of the federal government are vast and water rights are correspondingly
precious.' In 1908 the United States Supreme Court first recognized the
existence of water rights for federally reserved lands. 2 Since then, the
* B.A. 1983, Albion College; Member, Third Year Class. The author dedicates this
Note to her husband, Ronald Lee, and to her parents for their never-ending support.
1. The United States Senate has recognized the federal water rights problem as it exists
in the West:
With demand for water far outreaching increases in present sources of supply, con-
flicts between the States and the Federal Government over the control and use of
water are growing sharper and more serious. The problem is a national one, but its
threat is especially grave in the public lands of the semiarid West, where not only is
water even more scarce than elsewhere in the country, but where Federal ownership
of millions upon millions of acres of land give the Federal Government an asserted
basis for claiming proprietorship, "paramount rights," or title in fee simple absolute
to all unappropriated waters in many of our states.
SENATE SELECT COMM. ON NAT'L WATER RESOURCE, S. REP. No. 29, 87th Cong., 1st Sess.
65 (1961).
2. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908), is widely recognized as being the first
Supreme Court decision to adopt the federal reserved rights doctrine with respect to Indian
lands. The Court previously had alluded to the doctrine in dicta in United States v. Rio
Grande Dam and Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690, 701-03 (1899). Dean Trelease suggests that
these early reserved rights precedents were not recognized as such until Federal Power
Comm'n v. Oregon, 349 U.S. 435 (1955) (the Pelton Dam case). Trelease, Federal Reserved
Water Rights Since PLLRC, 54 DEN. L.J. 473, 475 (1977).
"Reserved lands" are lands that have been removed from the public domain for a particu-
lar purpose, such as the establishment of a national park, national forest, Indian reservation, or
military facility. This reservation may be accomplished by statute, executive order, or treaty.
Federal Power Comm'n, 349 U.S. at 443-44 (1955); In re Water of Hallett Creek Stream Sys.,
44 Cal. 3d 448, 456 n.5, 749 P.2d 324, 326 n.5, 243 Cal. Rptr. 887, 890 n.5 (1988).
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Court consistently has held that when the federal government withdraws
lands from the public domain,3 it implicitly reserves the amount of unap-
propriated appurtenant water necessary to accomplish the purposes of
the reservation.4 Because Congress rarely makes an explicit reservation
of water rights when it withdraws 5 lands from the public domain, this
rule, the "federal reserved rights doctrine," has potentially far-reaching
ramifications.
The federal reserved rights doctrine conflicts with the generally con-
trolling, Western State doctrine of "prior appropriation." 6 Under the
doctrine of prior appropriation, the first person to apply water to a bene-
ficial use is first in right against later appropriators. 7 The appropriator's
right vests on the date ("priority date") the water is applied to the benefi-
cial use.8 The doctrine of prior appropriation also limits water diversions
to a specific amount and only for a defined purpose.9 In contrast, the
federal reserved rights doctrine vests in the federal government an un-
specified right that may be exercised in a manner inconsistent with water
uses sanctioned by state law.10 Moreover, federal reserved water rights
are superior to those of persons subsequently appropriating water under
state law. "
3. " 'Public domain' lands are lands open to settlement, sale, or disposition under the
federal public land laws." Hallett, 44 Cal. 3d at 456 n.5, 749 P.2d at 326 n.5, 243 Cal. Rptr. at
890 n.5.
4. See, e.g., Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 138 (1976) ("[The Supreme Court]
has long held that when the Federal Government withdraws its land from the public domain
... by implication [it] reserves appurtenant water then unappropriated to the extent needed to
accomplish the purpose of the reservation.").
5. "The words 'withdrawn' and 'reserved' are frequently used interchangeably... and
cannot be distinguished with separate precise meanings." In re Paug-Vik, Inc., 85 Interior
Dec. 229, 235 (1978).
6. The National Water Commission has observed that states cannot be "neatly classified
as appropriation or riparian." U.S. NAT'L WATER COMM'N, A SUMMARY DIGEST OF STATE
WATER LAWS 5 (1973). The Commission has further noted that:
It is true that riparian law was applied in the East and appropriation law developed
in the West, but it is not true-as commonly assumed-that there are 19 appropria-
tion States (from North Dakota to Texas, and States situated west thereof) and 31
riparian States (those remaining). Some Western States (such as Texas, California,
and Hawaii), have always recognized certain riparian water rights, and some 'pure'
appropriation States ... which have emphatically and repeatedly rejected the entire
regime of riparian rights (such as Utah, Nevada, and Idaho) have consistently ap-
plied some riparian concepts ....
Id.
7. See infra notes 135-36 and accompanying text.
8. See, e.g., W. HUTCHINS, THE CALIFORNIA LAW OF WATER RIGHTS 55 (1956) ("The
time of accrual of an appropriate right is the date of priority.").
9. See infra notes 136-37 and accompanying text.
10. Boles & Elliott, United States v. New Mexico and the Course of Federal Reserved
Water Rights, 51 U. COLO. L. REV. 209, 213 (1980).
11. See, e.g., Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 138 (1976) ("[Reserved water
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The disparities between these two doctrines concern many Wes-
terners. The federal reserved rights doctrine has been characterized as "a
'sword of Damocles' hanging over 'every title to water rights to every
stream which touches a federal reservation.' ,12 Many Western users fear
that the federal government simply will take their water and their invest-
ments will "go down the drain." 13 The Supreme Court, however, has
construed the reserved rights doctrine very narrowly. The Court has
maintained that it will find an implied federal reserved water right only
after it carefully scrutinizes the federal government's asserted water right
and specific purposes for which the land was reserved and concludes that
"without the water the purposes of the reservation would be entirely de-
feated."' 4 This relatively rigid test places a heavy burden upon the gov-
ernment to establish that Congress implicitly has reserved water rights.
If the Court does not find an implied reservation of water, the United
States must acquire water "in the same manner as any other public or
private appropriator." 15
A recent debate has arisen concerning the extent to which the fed-
eral government may preserve minimum instream flows16 on lands it has
reserved for such purposes as maintaining wildlife habitats and preserv-
ing recreational, scenic, and other aesthetic values. When these purposes
are deemed not to be "primary" purposes for which the land was initially
reserved, the federal government may protect these values only under
state water law.17 Unfortunately, state water laws provide inadequate
protection for these values.
rights] vest on the date of the reservation and [are] superior to the rights of future
appropriators.").
12, See Trelease, supra note 2, at 475.
13. Id. at 474.
14. United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 700 (1978).
15. Id at 702.
16. For purposes of this Note, the term "minimum instream flows" refers to preservation
of the minimum amount of water required to support scenic, aesthetic, wildlife, and other
values for which land has been withdrawn from the public domain. The extent to which these
values are preserved depends upon the purposes of the land reservation. For example, mini-
mum instream flow protection for wilderness areas may not include a water reservation for
recreational purposes, but minimum instream flow protection for National Park purposes gen-
erally does include a water reservation for recreation. See infra notes 79-80 and accompanying
text.
17. New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 702. In New Mexico the Court held that "[w]here water is
necessary to fulfill the very purposes for which a federal reservation was created, it is reason-
able to conclude, even in the face of Congress' express deference to state water law in other
areas, that the United States intended to reserve the necessary water." Id. The Court added
that "[w]here water is only valuable for a secondary use of the reservation ... there arises the
contrary inference that Congress intended, consistent with its other views, that the United
States would acquire water in the same manner as any other public or private appropriator."
Id.
Relying on these statements in New Mexico, the California Supreme Court determined in
1988 that the federal government could seek riparian rights on federal lands under California
July 1990] RESERVED WATER RIGHTS
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Preservation of instream flows contravenes the policies underlying
Western State water law. The rapid growth and development of the
West have depended upon manipulation of scarce water resources. One
writer has observed:
In the West, lack of water is the central fact of existence, and a whole
culture and set of values have grown up around it. In the East, to
"waste" water is to consume it needlessly or excessively. In the West,
to waste water is not to consume it-to let it flow by unimpeded and
undiverted down rivers.'
8
Consequently, it is unrealistic to expect adequate recognition of instream
values in Western State water laws. Although many statutes provide
some protection of instream flows, they simply do not afford the level of
protection available under the federal reserved rights doctrine. Congres-
sional action defining the scope of federal reserved rights sufficiently
could protect instream values on federally reserved lands.
Part I of this Note surveys the historical background of the federal
reserved rights doctrine. Part II focuses on judicial interpretations of the
reserved rights doctrine pertaining to the preservation of instream flows
for aesthetic, wildlife, and other purposes for which the land is reserved.
Part III discusses the implications of requiring the federal government to
seek water for these purposes under state law and concludes that state
law inadequately protects instream flows. Part IV proposes legislation
that may remedy many of the problems with current water law. This
proposed legislation suggests clarifying the scope of federal reserved
water rights to ensure that water will be available to accomplish the pur-
poses for which Congress reserves lands.
I. Historical Background of the Federal
Reserved Rights Doctrine
Various provisions of the United States Constitution have been
viewed as authority for the federal reserved rights doctrine.19 The com-
merce clause20 and the property clause2I are the most commonly recog-
law. In re Water of Hallett Creek Sys., 44 Cal. 3d 448, 458, 749 P.2d 324, 330, 243 Cal. Rptr.
887, 893 (1988).
18. M. REISNER, CADILLAC DESERT 12 (1986).
19. One writer observes that federal power to reserve water rights could be based upon
"all or some combination of the following: the commerce clause generally, the navigation
power, the welfare clause, the war power, the treaty power and the property power." Morre-
ale, Federal-State Conflicts over Western Waters-A Decade of Attempted "Clarifying Legisla-
tion," 20 RUTGERS L. REV. 423, 445 n.18 (1966).
20. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (Congress has the power "[t]o regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.").
21. Id., art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 (Congress has the power "to dispose of and make all needful
Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United
States.").
[Vol. 41
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nized sources of congressional power to reserve water rights.22 The
supremacy clause23 also has been asserted as a basis for granting federal
water claims preference over other users' claims.
24
The United States Supreme Court foreshadowed the doctrine of fed-
eral reserved water rights in United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irriga-
tion Co. 25 The issue in Rio Grande was whether an irrigation company
under state authorization could divert water in a manner that disrupted
the navigability of a waterway.26 The Court recognized Congress' power
under the commerce clause to regulate the navigability of waters and
thereby reserve an adequate flow of water for the beneficial uses of fed-
eral property. 27 By asserting that the federal government's superior
power over navigable waterways limits state water law, Rio Grande laid
the groundwork for the federal reserved rights doctrine.
The Supreme Court expressly articulated the doctrine in Winters v.
United States.28 Relying on Rio Grande, the Court held that the federal
government has authority to claim water apart from state law,29 and that
the federal government implicitly had reserved water for lands with-
drawn from the public domain for Native American use.30 Winters in-
volved a statute that reserved federal land for Native Americans to farm
22. See, eg., Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 138 (1976) ("Reservation of water
rights is empowered by the Commerce Clause, Art. I, § 8, which permits federal regulation of
navigable streams, and the Property Clause, Art IV, § 3, which permits federal regulation of
.federal lands.").
23. U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, § 2 ("the Laws of the United States... shall be the supreme
Law of the Land").
24. See Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 540 (1976) (holding that the federal gov-
ernment had authority to reserve water rights as sovereign under the supremacy clause and as
an ordinary proprietor of land under the property clause). Dean Trelease contends that the
supremacy clause alone is sufficient to justify reserved rights. F. TRELEASE, FEDERAL-STATE
RELATIONS IN WATER LAW 147 (1971). The doctrine, however, is based upon the idea that
the federal government reserves the previously unappropriated water necessary to accomplish
the purposes of the reservation. See Cappaert, 426 U.S. at 138; see also E. HANKS, FEDERAL-
STATE RIGHTS AND RELATIONS, 2 WATER AND WATER RIGHTS § 102.1 (R. Clark ed. Supp.
1978) (criticizing Trelease's view and suggesting that the federal government's power to pre-
empt state water rights must depend upon a preexisting ownership interest).
25. 174 U.S. 690 (1899).
26. Id. at 696.
27. In dictum, the Court observed:
[I]n the absence of specific authority from Congress a state cannot by its legislation
destroy the right of the United States, as the owner of lands bordering on a stream, to
the continued flow of its waters; so far at least as may be necessary for the beneficial
uses of the government property.
Id. at 703.
28. 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
29. "The power of the [Federal] Government to reserve the waters and exempt them
from appropriation under the state laws is not denied, and could not be." Id. at 577 (citing Rio
Grande, 174 U.S. at 702-03, and United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905)).
30. Id.
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but did not expressly provide for water to irrigate the reserved lands.
The Court found that "it would be extreme to believe" that when Con-
gress created the reservation, it intended to give the Indians "a barren
waste. ' 31 Thus, the Court concluded, Congress must have meant to re-
serve water for Native American use.32
For years many thought that the "Winters doctrine" was limited to
Native American water law.33 In Federal Power Commission v. Oregon
(the Pelton Dam case),34 the Supreme Court dispelled this assumption,
holding that a state could not deny a federal licensee's request to build a
dam on lands reserved for that purpose.35 Although the case did not ad-
dress water rights, the Court implied that the licensee was exercising a
right that the federal government simultaneously reserved with the dam
site.36 The Court thus found the federal rights superior to the rights of
subsequent state law appropriators.
The expansion of the Winters doctrine in Pelton Dam has been char-
acterized as a "real bombshell [that] lit a fire under western water law-
yers."' 37 Despite Westerners' concerns, the Supreme Court in Arizona v.
California38 reaffirmed its Pelton Dam holding. The Court asserted that
it had "no doubt about the power of the United States [under the com-
merce and property clauses] to reserve water rights for its reservations
and its property. ' 39 The Court concluded that "the principle underlying
the reservation of water rights for Indian reservations was equally appli-
cable to other federal establishments, such as ... National Forests." 4
This line of cases firmly established the legal basis for the federal
reserved rights doctrine and its applicability to all congressional reserva-





33. See Trelease, supra note 2, at 475 (asserting that "no one" regarded Rio Grande and
the Winters "Indian case" as precedents of the reserved right doctrine prior to Federal Power
Commission v. Oregon, 349 U.S. 435 (1955)).
34. 349 U.S. 435 (1955).
35. Id. at 445-46. The case involved a licensee under the Federal Power Act (currently
codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 791-828 (1988)). Id. at 443-44.
36. Id.
37. Trelease, supra note 2, at 477.
38. 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
39. Id. at 598.
40. Id. at 601. The Court found that "the United States intended to reserve water suffi-
cient for the future requirements of the Lake Mead National Recreation Area, the Havasu
Lake National Wildlife Refuge, the Imperial National Wildlife Refuge, and the Gila National
Forest." Id.
41. Trelease, Uneasy Federalism--State Water Laws and National Water Users, 55
WASH. L. REv. 751, 757 (1980).
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II. The Federal Reserved Rights Doctrine and Preservation of
Instream Flows
The evolution of the federal reserved rights doctrine alarmed Wes-
terners who envisioned sweeping divestment of their water rights. In re-
cent cases, however, the Supreme Court carefully has circumscribed the
application of the reserved rights doctrine. The cases have made clear
that the doctrine will be construed in a way that reserves only the
amount necessary to fulfill the primary purposes for which the land was
reserved, erring on the side of finding no reserved rights.
A. Judicial Application of the Federal Reserved Rights Doctrine to
Established Federal Reservations of Land
Most case law concerning federal reserved water rights for preserva-
tion of instream flows involves lands withdrawn from the public domain
for national forests, national parks, and national monuments. In these
cases, the courts have dissected the purposes for which Congress set aside
the land to determine if federal water rights accompany the reservation
of land.
The Supreme Court's conservative approach to the reserved rights
doctrine was illustrated in Cappaert v. United States.42 There the Court
recognized the federal reserved rights doctrine, but construed it nar-
rowly, holding that the doctrine "reserves only that amount of water nec-
essary to fulfill the purposes of the reservation, no more. 43 The question
before the Court was whether the reservation of the Devil's Hole Cavern
as a national monument reserved correlative water rights. Because the
proclamation that created the monument suggested that a pool in the
cavern should be protected, the Court concluded that a reserved right
was necessary to maintain the level of the pool.44
Two years later, in United States v. New Mexico,45 the Court re-
jected the federal government's claim that the Organic Administration
Act of 189746 and the Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act of 1960
(MUSYA)47 authorized the reservation of a minimum instream flow for
aesthetic, environmental, recreational, and wildlife purposes. The federal
42. 426 U.S. 128 (1976).
43. Id. at 141.
44. Id. at 139-40.
45. 438 U.S. 696 (1978).
46. 16 U.S.C. §§ 473-475 (1985). The statute defines the purposes for which the national
forests are to be established. Id § 475; see also New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 706-07 & n.14 (com-
menting on the statute's history).
47. 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-531 (1985). The statute provides, inter alia, "that the national for-
ests are established and shall be administered for outdoor recreation, range, timber, watershed,
and wildlife and fish purposes." Id. § 528. The New Mexico Court concluded that MUSYA
was "intended to broaden the purposes for which national forests had previously been adminis-
tered." New Mexico 438 U.S. at 713.
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government had argued that it was "entitled to reserved water rights to
the extent of the purposes of the federal enclave, whatever those purposes
may be."' 48 A majority of the Court, however, refused to adopt this ex-
pansive reading of the reserved rights doctrine.
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, focused on the tradi-
tional deference of the federal government to state water law.49 The ma-
jority maintained that when courts assess reserved rights claims, they
must carefully examine both the asserted water right and the specific pur-
poses for which the land was reserved.50 According to the majority, a
court may recognize reserved rights only upon concluding that "without
the water the purposes of the reservation would be entirely defeated."' 5'
In its analysis, the New Mexico Court first considered the legislation
that implemented the National Forest Service, namely the Creative Act
of 189752 and the Organic Administration Act of 1897. 53 The Court
found that the legislative history showed Congress' intent to reserve na-
tional forests for only two purposes: " '[t]o conserve the water flows, and
to furnish a continuous supply of timber for the people.' -54 The Court
concluded that lands reserved as national forests do not carry reserved
water rights for "aesthetic, environmental, recreational, or wildlife-pres-
ervation purposes.155
The New Mexico court then examined MUSYA. The federal gov-
ernment contended that MUSYA "confirm[ed] that Congress always
foresaw broad purposes for the national forests and authorized the Secre-
tary of the Interior as early as 1897 to reserve water for recreational,
aesthetic, and wildlife-preservation uses."' 56 According to the federal
government, Congress intended that reserved water rights for these ex-
panded purposes would relate back to the pre-1960 date of the initial
reservation. 57 The Court, however, analyzed the legislative history of
MUSYA and rejected the government's argument. Recognizing Con-
gress' traditional deference to state water law in other areas, the Court
concluded that Congress did not intend to reserve additional water for
the purposes of MUSYA.
58
48. Brief for Petitioner at 20, United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978) (No. 77-
510).
49. "Where Congress has expressly addressed the question of whether federal entities
must abide by state water law, it has almost invariably deferred to the state law." New Mexico,
438 U.S. at 702 (citing California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 653-70 (1978)).
50. Id. at 700.
51. Id.
52. 16 U.S.C. § 471, repealed by P.L. 94-579, title VII § 704(a), 90 Stat. 2792 (1976).
53. 16 U.S.C. §§ 473-475 (1985).
54. 438 U.S. at 707 (quoting 30 CONG. REC. 967 (1897)).
55. Id. at 708.
56. Id. at 713 n.21.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 715.
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The New Mexico Court acknowledged that the preservation of in-
stream flows for wildlife, recreation, aesthetic values, and stock watering
are legitimate uses for national forest water. The Court, however, de-
clined to recognize reserved rights for these uses because they were not
among the "primary purposes" for which the land initially had been re-
served.5 9 The Court held that where "water is only valuable for a secon-
dary use of the reservation... there arises the contrary inference that
Congress intended, consistent with its other views, that the United States
would acquire water in the same manner as any other public or private
appropriator." 6o
The New Mexico Court did not address the question whether na-
tional forests reserved after 1960, the year in which Congress enacted
MUSYA, carried water rights for the additional national forest purposes
expressed in MUSYA. 61 The Court deemed MUSYA a simple land man-
agement directive and not legislation establishing new reservations of
water.62 It would be difficult to imagine, however, a scenario in which
the Court would read the statute differently for national forests reserved
after 1960. Under New Mexico, the federal government may obtain
water rights on national forest lands for these "secondary purposes" only
under state water law, presumably whether the reservation occurred
before or after the enactment of MUSYA.
In United States v. City and County of Denver,63 the Colorado
Supreme Court addressed this issue: whether MUSYA reserved addi-
tional water, with a 1960 priority date,64 for recreation, wildlife, and
other instream purposes. Denver involved integration of federal reserved
rights claims in a state water rights adjudication. 65 Using the New Mex-
59. Id. Some commentators have disputed the Court's interpretation of Congress' intent
in establishing the national forests. See, eg., Fairfax & Tarlock, No Water for the Woods: A
Critical Analysis of United States v. New Mexico, 15 IDAHO L. REV. 509, 526 (1979) ("the
reservation of water for instream uses is consistent with the original purpose of the
reservations").
60. 438 U.S. at 702.
61. Id. at 715 n.22. Significantly, the federal government did not argue that MUSYA
created additional reserved rights with a priority date of 1960. The Court, however, suggested
in dictum that MUSYA did not create those rights, stating that "Congress intended the na-
tional forests to be administered for broader purposes after 1960 but there is no indication that
[Congress] believed the new purposes to be so crucial as to require a reservation of additional
water." Id.
62. Id. at 715.
63. 656 P.2d I (Colo. 1982).
64. If additional water was reserved with a 1960 priority date, rights in this water would
have vested at that time and would be superior to any claims of appropriators after that date.
65. Denver, 656 P.2d at 4. State adjudication proceedings are brought in accordance with
state law to quantify each water user's rights within a given stream or watershed. Kosloff,
Water for Wilderness: Colorado Court Expands Federal Reserved Rights, 16 ENVTL. L. REp.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 10002, 10003 n.15 (1986). If a user participates in the adjudication, but fails
to assert a claim to water rights, the claim is lost. Id
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ico Court's analysis, the Colorado Supreme Court concluded that
MUSYA created no new water rights for the broader purposes embodied
in the Act and denied the federal government's reserved rights claim for
instream flow protection in certain National Forest Service lands. 66 The
court reasoned that Congress was cognizant of the reserved rights doc-
trine when it passed MUSYA, yet it "chose not to reserve additional
water explicitly."
'67
In Denver, the federal government had claimed reserved water rights
for recreational boating in Dinosaur National Monument. Denying the
government's claim, the court found that Congress had not intended to
reserve water for recreational purposes when it enacted the American
Antiquities Preservation Act of 1906 ("Antiquities Act"), 68 which au-
thorized the creation of national monuments. 69 The federal government
had argued that the Antiquities Act authorized the National Park Ser-
vice to manage the Monument. 70 This gave rise to an implied reservation
of water for purposes including recreation under the National Park Ser-
vice Act of 1916. 7 1 The court rejected this argument, reasoning that ac-
ceptance of the government's position "would mean that Congress ha[d],
sub silentio, eliminated all basic distinctions between national monu-
ments and national parks."'7
2
The Denver court also addressed the propriety of recognizing re-
served water rights for Rocky Mountain National Park.73 The court
overturned the lower court's determination that the priority date for all
reserved water rights in the park is the date the park was transferred
from national forest status to national park status. Instead, the court
adopted the federal government's position that to the extent national for-
est and national park purposes overlap, the proper priority date should
66. 656 P.2d at 6. The National Forest Service lands at issue were in the Arapaho Na-
tional Forest, Grand Mesa National Forest, Gunnison National Forest, Manti-La Sal National
Forest, Routt National Forest, Uncompahgre National Forest, and the White River National
Forest. Also at issue were water rights in Rocky Mountain National Park, Colorado National
Monument, and Dinosaur National Monument.
67. Id. at 26 ("In the face of its silence, we must assume that Congress intended the
federal government to proceed like any other appropriator and to apply for or purchase water
rights when there was a need for water.").
68. 16 U.S.C. §§ 431-433 (1982).
69. Id. § 431. This section of the Antiquities Act authorizes the establishment of "his-
toric landmarks, historic and prehistoric structures, and other objects of historic or scientific
interest" as national monuments.
70. 656 P.2d at 27-28 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 431 (1976)). Dinosaur National Monument was
placed under the "supervision, management and control" of the National Park Service. Id.
(quoting Proclamation No. 2290, 3 C.F.R. 36-37 (1938-1943), reprinted in 53 Stat. 2454
(1938)).
71. Id. at 28.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 30.
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be the date of the initial national forest reservation. 74 The Denver court
observed that "[n]ational parks exist for the purposes of protecting wa-
tershed and timber resources (also the national forest purposes), in addi-
tion to broader purposes of, inter alia, conserving scenery, historic and
scientific objects, and wildlife."'75 The court found "no reason to believe
that the transferral of national forest lands [to the national park system]
extinguishe[d] the purposes of timber and watershed protection estab-
lished by the Organic Act of 1897."76 Consequently, the court deemed
the priority date of reserved rights for these national park purposes to be
the date the lands were set aside for national forest use.77 The court ad-
ded that reservation of additional water for other national park purposes,
such as wildlife and aesthetics, would "have a priority date from the time
the national park was established."78
The Denver court held that reserved water may be available on Na-
tional Park Service lands to protect instream flows for scenic and wildlife
purposes because the National Park Service Act of 1916 provides that
parks exist for purposes broader than those for which national forests
were created.79 This ruling embraces New Mexico's implication that re-
served rights for these purposes are appropriate for National Park Ser-
vice lands.80
B. Application of the Federal Reserved Rights Doctrine to National
Wilderness Areas
Federal designation of wilderness areas raises a host of additional
questions concerning federal reserved water rights. Particularly trouble-
some is the question whether the designation of land as a wilderness area
includes reserved water rights.
The Wilderness Act of 196481 created the National Wilderness Pres-




77. Id at 30-31.
78. Id
79. Id. (citing the National Park Service Act of 1916, 16 U.S.C. § 1 (1976)).
80. The New Mexico Court cited the broad purposes of the National Park Service Act of
1916, 16 U.S.C. § 1 (1976), to illustrate that Congress had not intended to reserve water for
aesthetic values, wildlife protection, and stockwatering on National Forest Service lands: the
"fundamental purpose of the said parks, monuments and reservations is to conserve the scen-
ery and the natural and historic objects and the wildlife therein." New Mexico, 438 U.S. at
709. Thus, it appears the Court might agree to the assertion of federal reserved rights for these
purposes on National Park Service lands.
81. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1136 (1985).
The Wilderness Act endowed the Wilderness System with over nine million acres of na-
tional forest lands that previously had been identified as "wilderness" or "wild areas." Id
§ I132(a)(1). The Act also directed the Secretary of Agriculture to study over five million
July 1990]
public lands to be preserved "unimpaired for future use and enjoyment as
wilderness."8 2 The Act defines wilderness as "an area where the earth
and its community of life are untrammeled by man, where man himself is
a visitor who does not remain."' 83 It charges the federal land managing
agencies84 to preserve the wilderness character of these areas while con-
tinuing to manage them to accomplish their original purposes. 85
Prior to inclusion in the Wilderness Preservation System, lands that
are part of the national forest or national park systems, as well as other
types of reserved lands, are imbued with reserved water rights to accom-
plish the primary purposes of their original reservation. Whether con-
gressional designation of an area as "wilderness" gives rise to additional
reserved water rights for purposes expressed in the Wilderness Act is
controversial. 86
Until recently, the question of reserved water rights for wilderness
areas was largely academic. The practical effect of reserved rights on
National Forest Service and National Park Service lands is minimal87
acres of National Forest Service lands for possible inclusion in the Wilderness System and the
Secretary of Interior to assess the wilderness potential of National Park System and National
Wildlife Refuge System lands. Id. § 1132. They were expected to make recommendations to
Congress and the President within ten years of enactment. Id. In addition, the Federal Land
Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA), 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1782 (1985), directed the
Bureau of Land Management (BLM) to undertake a similar review of its lands for wilderness
potential within fifteen years. Id. § 1782(a).
The Wilderness System now contains 455 protected areas comprising over 88 million
acres. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, WILDERNESS: OVERVIEW AND STATISTICS 5
(1988) (citing U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE AND DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,
TWENTY-SECOND ANNUAL WILDERNESS REPORT ON THE STATUS OF THE NATIONAL WIL-
DERNESS PRESERVATION SYSTEM FOR THE CALENDAR YEAR 1985 (Unpublished) (1986)).
Additionally, the federal land management agencies have recommended adding over 15 mil-
lion acres to the Wilderness System. Id. More than 123 million acres are still being examined
for wilderness potential. Id.
82. 16 U.S.C. § 1131(a) (1985). The Act prohibits, with certain exceptions, commercial
enterprises, roads, motorized vehicles, and structures within areas designated as "wilderness."
Id. § 1133(c).
83. Id. § 1131(c) ("An area of wilderness is further defined to mean in this chapter an
area of undeveloped Federal land retaining its primeval character and influence without per-
manent improvements or human habitation, which is protected and managed so as to preserve
its natural conditions.").
84. The United States' land management agencies are the Department of the Interior,
Department of Agriculture, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, and Bureau of Land Management.
85. 16 U.S.C. § 1133(b) (1985).
86. If reserved rights exist for purposes of the Wilderness Act-that is, to preserve these
areas as "unimpaired" and "primeval"-then more water necessarily would be required than
would be required for national forest purposes as defined by the Court in New Mexico. See
supra notes 52-60 and accompanying text.
87. In a memorandum to the Secretary of the Interior, the Solicitor of the Department of
the Interior stated that reports from regional Interior Department offices indicate that the Fish
and Wildlife Service has filed no reserved right claims for wilderness areas and that the Park
Service has filed only four. Solicitor's Op. M-36914 (supp. III) 8 (1988).
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because in the West the vast majority of these areas are situated upstream
from most competing water users.88 Furthermore, nearly seventy-five
percent of the land currently examined for wilderness potential, includ-
ing all of the National Wildlife Refuge lands, is in Alaska, where the
existence of reserved rights seemingly would have minimal significance
because of the sparse competition for available resources.
Nevertheless, a judicial determination concerning reserved water
rights for wilderness purposes could have great practical significance,
specifically with regard to the Bureau of Land Management's (BLM)
ongoing wilderness review of over twenty-seven million acres. Much of
the BLM land under consideration is located downstream from areas
where water resources have been extensively developed.8 9 BLM lands,
unlike National Forest Service and Park Service lands selected for wil-
derness designation, are not "reserved" lands but are part of the public
domain. Therefore, BLM wilderness areas would not be imbued with
reserved water rights unless wilderness designation itself is deemed to
furnish such rights. 90 Although a finding of reserved water rights for wil-
derness areas would not preempt existing water uses,91 it would ensure
the availability of water for federal claims.
A determination that wilderness designation gives rise to reserved
water rights turns on whether the designation constitutes a new reserva-
tion of land for a specific purpose. This appears analogous to an issue
faced by the Supreme Court in United States v. New Mexico.92 The New
Mexico Court determined that MUSYA did not establish additional
water rights dating back to the initial reservation of the land.93 Adopting
this analysis, a court interpreting the Wilderness Act might conclude
that the Wilderness Act did not set aside additional water for "wilder-
88. See United States v. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co., 697 F.2d 851, 859 (9th Cir. 1983)
("[S]ince the sought-after [reserved] right is one of instream flow ohly and not of diversion,
awarding it would not harm downstream interests. The only result of recognizing a reserved
right of instream flow [would] be to restrict upstream diversion by appropriators with a later
priority date than the date of dedication of the national forest.").
89. See Additions to the National Wilderness Preservation System: Hearings on H.R. 34
and H.R. 4233 Before the Subcomm. on Public Lands of the House Comm. on Interior and
Insular Affairs, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 66 (1986) (statement of Dean Davis, President, Colorado
Cattlemen's Association).
90. BLM lands are managed pursuant to the Federal Lands Policy Management Act
(FLPMA), 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1782 (1985). In Sierra Club v. Watt, 659 F.2d 203 (D.C. Cir.
1981), the court held that FLPMA did not withdraw BLM lands from the public domain;
therefore, the Act did not reserve water rights. Id. at 206. The Supreme Court has yet to
address this question, but given the narrow view the Court has taken concerning reserved
rights, it probably would uphold the D.C. Circuit's view.
91. Pre-existing uses would not be preempted because reserved rights apply only to water
unappropriated at the time the land is withdrawn from the public domain. See Cappaert v.
United States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976).,
92. 438 U.S. 696 (1978).
93. See supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.
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ness" purposes dating back to the original reservation. Likewise, the rea-
soning of the Colorado Supreme Court in Denver, which culminated in a
finding that Congress intended no reserved water rights dating from
MUSYA's enactment, also might be applied to the Wilderness Act.94
New Mexico, however, also established that the recognition of re-
served rights requires a careful analysis of the statute defining the reser-
vation, an examination of the asserted water right, and finally a finding
that "without the water the purposes of the reservation would be entirely
defeated." 95 Under these guidelines, two provisions of the Wilderness
Act are particularly relevant in calculating whether wilderness designa-
tion yields reserved water rights.
First, section 4(d) of the Wilderness Act provides:
(6) Nothing in this Act shall constitute an express or implied claim or
denial on the part of the Federal Government as to exemption from
State water laws. (7) Nothing in this Act shall be construed as affect-
ing the jurisdiction or responsibilities of the several States with respect
to wildlife and fish in the national forests. 96
Viewed in isolation, this language suggests that the Wilderness Act is
intended to have no impact on existing water law and, arguably, to dis-
claim new reserved water rights.97 Alternatively, the language might not
preclude new reserved rights, but instead may indicate that States are to
apply existing principles of law, including reserved rights, when designat-
ing these lands.
Second, section 4 of the Wilderness Act also provides that the pur-
poses of the Act are "within and supplemental to the purposes for which
national forests and units of the national park and national wildlife ref-
uge systems are established and administered. ' 98 By stating that the pur-
poses of the Act are "within and supplemental to" existing area
purposes, the provision suggests that wilderness designation is more than
a mere management directive. 99 The language could be construed to es-
tablish new and supplemental purposes for the land that would carry
additional water rights.
94. See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
95. 438 U.S. at 700.
96. 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(6)-(7) (1985).
97. See supra notes 129-30 and accompanying text.
98. Id. § 1133(a).
99. See, e.g., 86 Interior Dec. 553, 610 n.105 (1979) (asserting that the language of sec-
tion 4 "forecloses any argument that wilderness area designation is subsidiary to other man-
agement objectives").
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1. Judicial Application of the Federal Reserved Rights Doctrine to National
Wilderness Areas
The federal courts first addressed the wilderness reserved rights
question in Sierra Club v. Block (Sierra Club I),100 in which the District
Court of Colorado ruled that federal reserved water rights do exist for
wilderness purposes. In Sierra Club I, the Sierra Club filed a claim
against the Secretary of Agriculture, who was responsible for managing
National Forest Service lands, for failing to assert reserved water rights
in several Colorado wilderness areas.101 The Sierra Club sought a deter-
mination not only that reserved rights exist under the Wilderness Act,
but that the Department of Agriculture has an affirmative obligation to
assert such rights to the extent necessary to preserve them in the face of
state water adjudications.1 0 2
The Sierra Club I court distinguished the New Mexico Court's con-
struction of MUSYA and held that unlike MUSYA, the Wilderness Act
did not "constitute an attempt to add to the primary purposes of existing
reservations," but instead created "an entirely new reservation of federal
lands."103 The Sierra Club I court noted that the Wilderness Act re-
quired that wilderness areas be "devoted to the public purposes of recrea-
tion, scenic, scientific, educational, conservation and historical use."1 4
The court also observed that "in designating wilderness areas in Colo-
rado specifically, Congress could not have made its intent to give effect to
all of the purposes of the Act more clear."10 5
Thus, the court concluded that federal water rights exist for pur-
poses expressed in the Wilderness Act, and therefore that they vest on
the date the individual wilderness designations were made just as with
any other reservation.10 6 Accordingly, the court remanded the action,
ordering the federal defendants to devise a plan "to comply with their
statutory obligations regarding protection and preservation of wilderness
water resources." 10 7
100. 622 F. Supp. 842, 846 (1D. Colo. 1985).
101. The Sierra Club sought review of the Secretary of Agriculture's failure to assert re-
served rights for certain wilderness areas under section 10(a) of the Administrative Procedures
Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1982). For an argument that it is the duty of the Secretary of Agriculture
to assert federal water rights in wilderness areas, see Abrams, Water in the Western Wilder-
ness: The Duty to Assert Reserved Water Rights, 1986 U. ILL. L. REv. 387.
102. 622 F. Supp at 846-47. See infra note 116 and accompanying text.
103. 622 F. Supp. at 860.
104. Id. at 858 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1133(b) (1982)).
105. Id. at 860.
106. Id. at 862. See infra note 139 and accompanying text; see also infra text accompany-
ing note 155.
107. Id. at 865. The Secretary of Agriculture appealed the order requiring it to prepare a
plan; the Tenth Circuit, however, determined that appellate jurisdiction was lacking because
the district court's order was not yet final and reviewable. Sierra Club v. Lyng, Nos. 86-1153
to -1155, slip op. at 3 (10th Cir. Oct. 8, 1986).
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The federal government submitted its plan on November 26, 1986,
and the Sierra Club responded by filing a second action, Sierra Club v.
Lyng (Sierra Club I),108 attacking the sufficiency of the government's
report.
In Sierra Club I1, the federal defendants sought summary judgment
on all causes of action "on the grounds that no federal water rights were
impliedly reserved" when the wilderness areas in question were desig-
nated. 10 9 The defendants claimed that section 4(d)(7) of the Wilderness
Act 110 "was intended to forbid new federal water rights which could in-
terfere with water projects."' I IThe court rejected this argument, how-
ever, finding that section 4(d)(7) "does not purport to work any
substantive change in the rights parties may acquire under the various
doctrines of water law, including the reserved rights doctrine. '" 112 In sup-
port, the court cited an Interior Department memorandum 13 and the
Colorado Supreme Court's decision in Denver. 1
14
Although Sierra Club I and Sierra Club II strongly support the
existence of wilderness reserved water rights, the Colorado courts refused
to order the Forest Service to assert these rights. The Sierra Club I court
acknowledged that although "the Wilderness Act unequivocally imposes
certain duties on the part of agencies and officials administering the wil-
derness areas," the statute evinces "no specific legal duty" on the part of
the federal government to assert a reserved rights claim on wilderness
lands.' 15 Without a "clear statutory directive," the court concluded that
it lacked the power to order the federal government to assert these
rights. 116
The Sierra Club 1I court acknowledged that the failure of the federal
government to claim reserved rights in a timely fashion may adversely
108. 661 F. Supp. 1490 (D. Colo. 1987).
109. Id. at 1492.
110. 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(7) (1985).
111. 661 F. Supp. at 1492.
112. Id. at 1494.
113. 86 Interior Dec. 553 (1979). See infra notes 118-23 and accompanying text.
114. 656 P.2d 1 (Colo. 1982). The Sierra Club I court noted that although the issue of
reserved rights for wilderness was not before the court in Denver, the Colorado Supreme
Court's Sierra Club II, decision "does not imply that the reserved rights doctrine does not
apply to wilderness areas." 661 F. Supp. at 1494.
115. Sierra Club v. Block (Sierra Club I), 622 F. Supp. 842, 864 (D. Colo. 1985). See also
Sierra Club v. Andrus, 487 F. Supp. 443, 448 (D.D.C. 1980) (holding that in the absence of a
specific congressional directive, the Secretary of the Interior, the Park Service, and the Bureau
of Land Management had no duty to assert federal reserved rights for the Grand Canyon
National Park, Glen Canyon National Recreation Area, and various BLM lands).
116. 622 F. Supp. at 864. The Sierra Club alleged that the Forest Service had violated the
Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1982), by "arbitrarily and capriciously"
withholding legally required agency action. 622 F. Supp. at 846. The court held that absent
an express statutory duty to act, it could not find that the agency's action violated the Admin-
istrative Procedures Act. Id. at 864-65.
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affect those rights through operation of state law.1 17 The court reasoned,
however, that although the government is required to meet its statutory
duties as set forth in the Wilderness Act, the method used "is a matter
left to [the government's] discretion."' 118 Significantly, the court found
that the government was free to pursue methods other than reserved
rights for protecting wilderness area water.1 19
2. The Executive Branch's Comments on the Application of the Federal
Reserved Rights Doctrine to National Wilderness Areas
The issue of federal reserved water rights for wilderness areas has
not yet reached the United States Supreme Court. The lower courts, in
Sierra Club I and Sierra Club II, found themselves powerless to compel
the executive branch to assert reserved rights in the absence of an express
congressional directive.120 Likewise, even if the Supreme Court deter-
mines that Congress had intended reserved water rights to accompany
wilderness designation, the Court nevertheless might find that there is no
judicial authority to order the executive branch to assert those rights.
Because Congress generally has remained silent on the issue of reserved
water rights, the importance the executive branch places on pursuing
these rights takes on increased significance.
In 1979, the Solicitor for the Department of the Interior issued a
memorandum (the Krulitz opinion) 121 that concluded that lands desig-
nated by Congress as wilderness areas should receive federal reserved
water rights necessary to accomplish the primary purposes of the Wilder-
ness Act, including recreation, scenic, and conservation purposes.1 22 The
Interior Department interpreted the Wilderness Act as more than a man-
agement directive. According to the Krulitz opinion section 4 of the
Wilderness Act clarified that for National Park Service and Fish and
Wildlife Service lands, "wilderness designations establish purposes for
the creation of the reservations; Le., designation as wilderness does more
than merely authorize secondary uses entailing no reserved water
rights."1 23 Furthermore, the Krulitz opinion reasoned that the language
in section 4(d)(7) of the Wilderness Act was not intended to "undercut
117. 661 F. Supp. at 1496. The court cited United States v. Bell, 724 P.2d 631 (Colo.
1986), as an example of how delays by the government may jeopardize reserved rights claims.
In Bell, federal reserved rights were subordinated to the rights of other users through opera-
tion of Colorado state law because the government failed to assert reserved rights. The Bell
court applied Colorado's "postponement doctrine" under which a "failure to adjudicate the
[water] rights results in the rights being junior to rights being adjudicated." IM at 642.
118. 661 F. Supp. at 1501 (citing Sierra Club I 622 F. Supp. at 865).
119. Id. at 1503. For example, the court found that the Forest Service could protect wil-
derness water resources by denying or imposing protective land-use conditions. Id. at 1503-04.
120. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
121. So named for then Solicitor of the Department of Interior Leo M. Krulitz.
122. 86 Interior Dec. 553, 609-10 (1979).
123. Id. at 610.
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the implied reserved water rights doctrine." 124 Instead, the "provision is
intended to continue the application of then-existing principles of federal-
state relations in water law, which includes the reserved water rights doc-
trine." 125 This reasoning appears consistent with that employed by the
Colorado District Court in Sierra Club I and Sierra Club 11.126
The most recent executive branch comment on the wilderness re-
served water rights question is a 1988 Interior Department memorandum
(the Hodel opinion). 127 This memorandum expressly superseded the
Krulitz opinion and concluded that "the better legal view with regard to
the creation of Federal reserved water rights in wilderness areas is that
Congress intended not to reserve water for those areas." 128 In examining
the legislative history behind section 4(d)(7) of the Wilderness Act, 129 the
Interior Department concluded that the provision was enacted "to spe-
cifically avoid the creation of new or additional reserved water rights in
the wilderness areas" in light of the Western States' concerns regarding
water rights. 130 "To the extent that wilderness areas are in need of water
to achieve their purposes," the opinion states, "such water may be ac-
quired by purchase or by appropriation for wilderness or related pur-
poses under applicable state law." 131 In addition, Congress can reserve
water expressly for any wilderness area.
132
The Hodel opinion fails to shed light on section 4 of the Wilderness
Act. It interprets section 4(d)(7) of the Act as an expression of Congress'
intent to disclaim reserved water rights, but it does not explain suffi-
ciently the section 4 language that appears to establish new reservations
of land with correlative water rights. 133 In contrast, the Krulitz opinion
gives effect to the language in both section 4 and section 4(d)(7) of the




126. See supra notes 100-14 and accompanying text. The conclusions of the Krulitz opin-
ion, however, have been criticized by some commentators as being inconsistent with case law.
See, e.g., Waring & Samelson, Non-Indian Federal Reserved Water Rights, 58 DEN. L.J. 783,
792 (1981) ("[tfhe Solicitor's conclusions concerning reserved rights for wilderness areas are
not supported by the Supreme Court's analysis in [New Mexico]"); Tarlock, Protection of
Water Flows for National Parks, 22 LAND & WATER L. REV. 29, 44 (1987) (calling the Krulitz
opinion an attempted "end-run" around the New Mexico decision).
127. Solicitor's Op. M-36914 (Supp. III) 37 (1988) (so named for then Secretary of Inte-
rior Donald Hodel).
128. Id.
129. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
130. Solicitor's Op. M-36914 (Supp. III) at 37.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
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In response to the Hodel opinion, then Attorney General Edwin
Meese sent a letter to then Secretary of the Interior Donald Hodel, de-
claring that "in the absence of express statutory language, [the Depart-
ment of Justice] will not assert reserved wilderness water rights under
federal law in any further litigation on behalf of the United States, but
will seek water for wilderness purposes where appropriate under state
law."13
4
It is not known whether the courts will concur with Meese's opinion
concerning the existence of reserved water rights for areas designated
under the Wilderness Act. Even if reserved wilderness water rights are
upheld by the courts, unless the Bush Administration affirmatively
adopts a more conservationist posture than that of the Reagan Adminis-
tration, the government's apparent unwillingness to pursue wilderness re-
served water rights will impede the exercise of these rights. Sierra Club
II demonstrates that a battle to force the government to assert reserved
water rights will not be won without help from Congress. If the current
Administration adheres to the position taken in the Hodel opinion, wil-
derness reserved water rights-if indeed they do exist-likely will remain
unasserted.
M. Implications of Requiring the Federal Government to Seek
Water Rights for Instream Preservation through
Western States' Water Laws
A lack of specificity in the various statutes authorizing withdrawals
of land from the public domain accounts for the ambiguities in applying
the reserved rights doctrine. Because of Congress' failure to provide ex-
plicit directives on the extent of reserved water rights and the federal
government's obligations to assert these rights, a dubious future exists for
preservation of instream values on many reserved lands. In the face of
Congress' silence, the courts are required to fill in the blanks-an exer-
cise that has resulted in the denial of reserved water rights for many of
the statutorily defined purposes of reserved land. If federal reserved
water rights are not recognized, the federal government must seek water
rights through state law. State law, however, does not provide sufficient
protection for instream values.
Most Western States have adopted a self-made system of water law
known as the prior appropriation doctrine. Under this doctrine, the
water user who is first in time in applying water to a beneficial use 135 is
134. Letter from Attorney General Edwin Meese to Secretary of the Interior Donald Ho-
del (July 28, 1988).
135. "Beneficial use" is defined under the laws of each individual state. Because states
naturally are interested in economic development, state laws traditionally have emphasized
consumptive use. As Dean Trelease notes,
[p]ractically all of the farmers, miners, manufacturers, power companies, and cities
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first in right against later appropriators. 136 The doctrine originated dur-
ing the California gold rush, 137 when the scarcity of water resources en-
couraged users to acquire and exercise water rights on non-riparian
land. 138 Western States have modified the doctrine to require a water
rights claimant to apply to the state for a permit authorizing an appropri-
ation. If the user applies the water to a statutorily defined beneficial use
within a reasonable time, the date of priority generally relates back to the
date of the application for the permit. 39 Traditionally in the West, ap-
propriation requires a physical diversion of the water, although there has
been some departure from this requirement. 40
A. Conflicts Between the Prior Appropriation and Federal Reserved Rights
Doctrines
Several important aspects of the prior appropriation doctrine con-
flict with the purposes of federal reserved rights for instream protection.
The most obvious distinction lies in the fundamental underpinnings of
each doctrine: prior appropriation is a utilitarian doctrine, but federal
reserved rights is a conservational doctrine. As one commentator has
noted, "the mission of regional development" in the West, which "man-
dated an attempt to promote maximum utilization of water resources,"
instilled the utilitarian values in the prior appropriation doctrine."4 1
Also, instream reservation of water "was thought to be inconsistent with
the goal of maximum utilization because a reservation in place was sim-
of the West met this test when they took the water, since each had a practical wealth-
producing use in mind. Each use advanced the development of the resources of the
country, and was an increment toward maximization of the welfare of the people, the
state, and the nation.
Trelease, supra note 41, at 753.
136. The doctrine was established judicially in Irwin v. Phillips, 5 Cal. 140, 147 (1855), in
which the court adopted the doctrine in place of the common law system of riparianism gener-
ally practiced in the East.
137. See, e.g., Trelease, supra note 41, at 752 ("Western State water law grew out of the
California gold rush, when thousands of '49ers crowded the diggings at the mouths of the
Sierra canyons and staked their claims on the streambeds and banks.").
138. Fairfax & Tarlock, supra note 59, at 509. Non-riparian lands are those lying beyond
the natural watershed. The aridity of Western lands forced settlers to divert waters to make
the land habitable. See, e.g., Trelease, supra note 41, at 752 ("the first settler in a valley took
first choice of the land and took from the stream enough water to irrigate it").
139. See, e.g., CAL. WATER CODE § 1455 (Deering 1977) ("[t]he issuance of a permit
continues in effect the priority of right as of the date of the application").
140. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-103(4) (1973) (allowing "appropriation by the
state of Colorado . . .of such minimum flows . . . as are required to preserve the natural
environment to a reasonable degree"); TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 11.023 (Vernon 1988)
("Purposes for which water may be appropriated include 'recreation and pleasure,' 'public
parks,' and 'game preserves.' ").
141. Tarlock, Appropriation for Instream Flow Maintenance: A Progress Report on "New"
Public Western Water Rights, 1978 UTAH L. REV. 211, 211-12.
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ply not a 'use' as the custom of the region had come to define the
term." 142
Another distinction between the two doctrines lies in the traditional
appropriation requirement of physical diversion for a state law appropri-
ation. Although increased environmental awareness has prompted a
number of Western States to acknowledge the value of preserving in-
stream flows, 143 the interest of individual states in preserving instream
values on federal lands is rarely coextensive with the interest of the fed-
eral government. Therefore, deference to state Water law will not protect
instream conservation adequately. 44
. The Inadequacy of Instream Appropriations to Protect Federal Rights
Pursuing federal instream preservation through state law may prove
inadequate. States that merely "consider" instream values in the water
rights permitting process generally do not give high priority to preserva-
tion. 145 Most Western States consider domestic and agricultural uses the
"highest uses" of water.146 The determination to preserve instream val-
ues at the expense of other concededly important uses is often subjective
142. Id. at 212.
143. There are two types of statutory provisions that seek to afford protection for instream
flows: those that allow instream appropriations and require no physical diversion, see supra
note 140; and those that direct state agencies to consider instream values when authorizing
water permits, eg., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-703a (1984) ("the chief engineer shall withhold
from appropriation that amount of water deemed necessary to establish and maintain for the
identified watercourse the desired minimum stream flow").
144. See, eg., Additions to the National Wilderness Preservation System: Hearings on H.K?
34 and HR. 4233 Before the Subcomm. on Public Lands of the House Comm. on Interior and
Insular Affairs, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986) [hereinafter Hearings]. Representative Strang in-
troduced a rider to the Colorado Wilderness Act of 1985 that explicitly would have provided
that water rights for "wilderness purposes" must be asserted through Colorado state water
law.
Colorado statutorily provides that the state may appropriate for "such minimum flows...
as are required to preserve the natural environment to a reasonable degree." CoLo. REV.
STAT. § 37-92-103(4) (1973). Opposing the measure, Darrell Knuffke, Central Rockies Re-
gional Director, The Wilderness Society testified that
[t]he interest of any individual State in wilderness protection are rarely the same as
all of those of the people of the United States for whom the wilderness preservation
system was established. The standards of Colorado's Instream Flow Program are
not the standards of the Wilderness Act. It follows then that the management of a
land treasury, the wilderness system, ought not to fall to local option, and it should
be managed under a single uniform system, not 50 separate systems.
Hearings, supra at 62.
145. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-04-06.1 (1985) (listing fish, wildlife, and recrea-
tional uses as last among preferred uses).
146. See, eg., CAL. WATER CODE § 1254 (Deering 1977) ("In acting upon applications to
appropriate water the board shall be guided by the policy that domestic use is the highest use
and irrigation is the next highest use of water.").
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and discretionary. 147 In light of the ever-increasing competition for water
resources in the West,1 48 courts and state agencies are likely to give short
shrift to instream values.
Nonetheless, many Western water users maintain that in the states
that permit instream appropriations, 149 application of state law is prefer-
able to federal reserved water rights for certain purposes. For example,
during federal congressional hearings on the Colorado Wilderness Bill, 
1 5 0
the Executive Director of the Colorado Department of Natural Re-
sources testified that "the Colorado instream flow protection system can
do the best job of achieving certainty for water users and of protecting
instream flows needed for wilderness areas."1 5 1 He briefly described the
Colorado system and noted that the "statutory criterion is the amount of
water needed to preserve the natural environment to a reasonable
degree." 152
Environmentalists disagreed. A spokesperson for the environmen-
talists observed that "[t]he interests of any individual State in wilderness
protection are rarely the same as all of those of the people of the United
States for whom the wilderness preservation system was established."
153
He added that because the standards of the Colorado system are not the
standards embodied in the Wilderness Act, management of the wilder-
ness system "ought not fall to local option and it should be managed
under a single uniform system, not 50 separate systems.
1 54
Assuming state instream appropriation would afford the same level
of instream protection as federal reserved water rights, there remains the
additional problem of determining the priority date of the appropriation.
Under the prior appropriation doctrine, most states set the priority date
of a water right no earlier than the date of the user's application to the
state for a permit.1 55 Unless the federal government applies for instream
appropriations on the day the land is reserved (obviously impossible for
lands already reserved), the priority date of the federal government's
rights will be later than the priority date under the reserved rights doc-
trine. The practical effect on fully appropriated streams would be to de-
147. Tarlock, supra note 141, at 215-20.
148. For example, in California the demand for urban applied water is expected to rise by
32% by the year 2010. CALIF. DEP'T OF WATER RESOURCES, CALIFORNIA WATER: LOOK-
ING TO THE FUTURE 5 (Nov. 1987).
149. See infra note 156 and accompanying text.
150. H.R. 34, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).
151. Hearings, supra note 144, at 44 (statement of David Getches, Executive Director,
Colorado Department of Natural Resources, representing Governor Richard Lamm).
152. Id.
153. Id. at 62 (statement of Darrell Knuffke, Central Rockies Regional Director, The Wil-
derness Society).
154. Id.
155. See supra note 139.
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prive the federal land of all water for uses not characterized as having a
federally reserved right.
In addition to the conceptual differences between the federal re-
served rights doctrine and the prior appropriation doctrine, several prac-
tical problems arise when the federal government is required to rely on
state law for water on reserved lands. These pragmatic considerations
demonstrate that state law is an inferior means of protecting federal
interests.
2. Administrative Difficulties
If the federal government must resort to state water law to reserve
water for instream values, it faces the formidable challenge of complying
with the labyrinth of state laws that set forth standards for instream pres-
ervation. Although most Western States have enacted some form of stat-
utory protection for instream values, application of these laws often is
unclear. For example, some states have eliminated the diversion require-
ment, thereby allowing appropriations to preserve instream values. 156
Other states retain the diversion requirement but provide limited excep-
tions.157 Most Western States that retain the diversion requirement have
enacted statutory provisions directing the state to consider instream val-
ues when it grants permits for appropriation.1 58
In complying with state water laws, the federal government must
contend not only with the lack of uniformity in the state appropriation
schemes, but also with the statutory ambiguities. A 1982 Congressional
Research Service report on Western instream statutes enumerates some
of the more troublesome ambiguities that characterize these statutes:
It is not always clear, for example, whether a private citizen may take
advantage of the inclusion of instream flows as a beneficial use. Some
states expressly limit such appropriation to. the state, while other states
have no such express limitation. It is not clear whether the federal
government also may apply for such rights. Other states may recog-
nize a use such as "recreation" as a beneficial use, but may not ex-
156. See, eg., State Dep't of Parks v. Idaho Dep't of Water Admin., 96 Idaho 440, 530
P.2d 924 (1974). The Idaho Supreme Court held that because a state statute counted the
"preservation of water.., for scenic beauty and recreation[]" as a beneficial use, no physical
diversion would be required for appropriation. Id. at 445, 530 P.2d at 929 (citing IDAHO
CODE § 67-4307 (1971)).
157. See, e.g., CAL. WATER CODE § 1242.5 (Deering 1977) (allows appropriation of in-
stream storage right for releases to maintain water quality); NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-2,108
(1988) (allows an instream appropriation to be made only by the State Games and Parks Com-
mission or a natural resources district).
158. See, eg., CAL. WATER CODE § 1243 (Deering 1977) ("In determining the amount of
water available for appropriation..., the board shall take into account, whenever it is in the
public interest, the amounts of water required for recreation and the preservation and enhance-
ment of fish and wildlife resources."); NEB. REv. STAT. § 46-2,107 (1988) (directs considera-
tion of "multiple uses, including instrean flows").
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pressly address whether an instream right for the use may be
permitted. In light of other typical requirements that an application
for an appropriative water right include a diversion of water from the
source, considerable doubt remains as to whether certain states allow
instream rights. Some states may rank permitted uses, either expressly
by statute or through judicial interpretation, and typically recreational
and fish and wildlife protection are ranked very low. Therefore, such
uses may not be adequately protected in practice.
159
If the federal government must assert its instream claims under state
law, it will expend considerable effort in deciphering the applicable laws
throughout the West. Furthermore, the federal government may face de-
lays and high costs when it seeks water rights under state law because
these statutory ambiguities are likely to be resolved only through judicial
determinations. 160
B. California Water Law and Federal Water Rights
The issues regarding the use of state law for water on federally re-
served lands are particularly complicated in California, where the federal
government faces a unique system of water rights allocation. Unlike
most other Western States, California employs a dual system of water
law, which recognizes both prior appropriative and riparian rights. 16
A riparian right gives the owner of land bordering water the right to
make reasonable and beneficial use of that water.' 62 For appropriative
rights, the user must obtain a permit from the State Water Resources
Control Board to create and quantify her right.163 A riparian, however,
gains her water right through the land ownership. Furthermore, riparian
rights are inchoate and are not destroyed by nonuse. 164 Under Califor-
nia's dual system, a formerly dormant riparian right generally is para-
mount to all appropriative rights when its owner decides to exercise it. 165
159. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, STATUTES ON INSTREAM FLOWS IN THE
WESTERN STATES 1-2 (revised June 9, 1986).
160. Quantification of federal reserved water rights also requires adjudication. The law of
reserved rights, however, is applied uniformly throughout the nation.
161. People v. Shirokow, 26 Cal. 3d 301, 307, 605 P.2d 859, 864, 162 Cal. Rptr. 30, 34
(1980). For a discussion of the California dual system, see W. HUTCHINS, supra note 8, at 55-
67.
162. W. HUTCHINS, supra note 8, at 40.
163. CAL. WATER CODE § 1252 (Deering 1977).
164. Lux v. Haggin, 69 Cal. 255, 390, 10 P. 674, 753 (1886). Federal reserved rights
actually have been analogized to riparian rights in that they may be " 'called' by the holder as
the need for water arises." Fairfax & Tarlock, supra note 59, at 521 n.49. Reserved rights,
however, are limited to the amount of water needed to accomplish the primary purposes of the
reservation of land. Riparian rights are limited only by what the user reasonably can use for
beneficial purposes.
165. See, e.g., Peabody v. City of Vallejo, 2 Cal. 2d 351, 374-77, 40 P.2d 486, 494-96
(1935) "The preferential and paramount rights of the riparian owner [over the rights of an
appropriator] ... are entitled to the protection of the courts ...." Id. at 374, 40 P.2d at 494.
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In California, the federal government theoretically could pursue
water rights for purposes not recognized under the reserved rights doc-
trine. Because California case law has rejected instream appropriations
by both private and public claimants, 166 however, riparian rights hold the
most promise for the preservation of instream flows.
In 1988 the California Supreme Court rendered a landmark decision
regarding federal water rights. The court in In re Waters of the Hallett
Creek System 167 ruled that the federal government held riparian rights on
National Forest Service lands in California. In Hallett Creek, the federal
government claimed water rights in the Plumas National Forest under
two theories: as reserved rights for "primary" purposes such as firefight-
ing and roadwatering; and as riparian rights for "secondary" purposes,
including wildlife enhancement.' 68 The State Water Resources Control
Board (Board) contended that the federal government had no riparian
rights because the United States holds lands as a "sovereign" not as a
"proprietor."1 69
The court rejected the Board's argument, finding that the federal
government has riparian rights because it exercises the powers of a pro-
prietor as well as a sovereign over the public domain.' 70 Significantly,
however, the court held that the Board may subordinate the govern-
ment's unexercised riparian rights to appropriative rights "currently be-
ing exercised" and may "determine that the future riparian right shall
have a lower priority than any uses of water it authorizes before the ripa-
ButseeIn re Waters of Long Valley Creek Stream Sys., 25 Cal. 3d 339, 359, 599 P.2d 656, 668,
158 Cal. Rptr. 350, 362 (1979) (holding that in the context of a statutory adjudication proceed-
ig, the State Water Resources Control Board may decide that an unexercised riparian claim
loses priority with respect to all rights currently being exercised).
166. In California Trout, Inc. v. States Water Resources Control Bd., for example, the
court of appeals found that a valid appropriation requires physical diversion. 90 Cal. App. 3d
816, 819, 153 Cal. Rptr. 672, 674 (1979). Similarly, in Fullerton v. State Water Resources
Control Bd., the court held that the physical diversion requirement applied to public agencies.
90 Cal. App. 3d 590, 603, 153 Cal. Rptr. 518, 527 (1979).
167. 44 Cal. 3d 448, 746 P.2d 324, 243 Cal. Rptr. 887 (1988).
168. Id at 454-55, 746 P.2d at 325, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 889.
169. Id at 459, 746 P.2d at 328, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 892. The Board argued that the United
States held land as "sovereign" and not as an ordinary proprietor who could claim riparian
rights under state law. According to the Board, the United States, acting as a sovereign, de-
rives its rights solely from the Constitution and therefore cannot partake of proprietary rights
arising under state law. Id. The Board also argued that if the federal government once had
held riparian rights on federal lands, these rights were severed by Congress in enacting the
Mining Acts of 1866 and 1870, 43 U.S.C. § 661 (1982), and the Desert Lands Act of 1877, 43
U.S.C. §§ 321-323 (1982). 44 Cal. 3d at 461-62, 746 P.2d at 330, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 894. The
California Supreme Court rejected this argument, finding that if Congress had intended to
relinquish its riparian rights "it is reasonable to assume that that is precisely what Congress
would have said [in enacting these laws]." Id. at 467, 749 P.2d at 334, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 898.
170. Id at 460, 749 P.2d at 337, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 893 (quoting Kleppe v. New Mexico,
426 U.S. 529, 540 (1976)). The court cited the property clause of the United States Constitu-
tion as the basis for the federal government's power to act as a proprietor of its lands. Id.
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rian in fact attempts to exercise his right."171 As the late Justice Wiley
Manuel observed in an earlier opinion, 72 the effect of this rule is to rele-
gate riparian right holders to a "less than riparian status."'
173
Although the Hallett Creek decision affords the federal government
a means to pursue water rights for instream flows, the state's power to
subordinate "unexercised" riparian rights might give these rights a later
priority date than they would have received if the reserved rights doc-
trine were applied. 174 Thus, Hallett Creek may provide no greater protec-
tion for federal water rights than is available in other Western States.
Significantly, Hallett Creek characterized the federal government's
riparian rights for "wildlife purposes" as "unexercised."' 175 It remains
unclear, however, whether a California court would consider the govern-
ment to have exercised riparian rights if the government claimed that it
had exercised these rights for instream uses alone.
In sum, state law is an inferior means of protecting instream flows
on federally reserved land due to the ambiguous language of the various
state laws and their lack of uniformity. Further, even in states that are
relatively sympathetic to instream preservation, the priority of water
rights obtained under state law is likely to be lower than the priority
accorded federal reserved water rights. The federal reserved rights doc-
trine provides a better and more comprehensive method for preserving
scenic, wildlife, and other values.
IV. A Suggested Solution: Creating a Preference for Federal
Reserved Rights
Western water users criticize federal reserved rights for increasing
uncertainty in the allocation of precious water resources. Under prior
appropriation law, a water right is an identifiable property right that
vests at the time the water is put to beneficial use and exists for as long as
171. Id. at 471, 746 P.2d at 337, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 900 (citing In re Waters of Long Valley
Creek Stream Sys., 25 Cal. 3d 339, 359, 599 P.2d 656, 668, 158 Cal. Rptr. 350, 362 (1979)).
172. In re Waters of Long Valley Creek Sys., 25 Cal. 3d 339, 599 P.2d 656, 158 Cal. Rptr.
350 (1979).
173. Id. at 368, 599 P.2d at 675, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 368 (Manuel, J., concurring and
dissenting).
174. The traditional priority of riparian rights in California law apparently retains its vital-
ity in the context of "piecemeal adjudication" between small numbers of claimants. The abil-
ity of the Board to relegate unexercised riparian rights to a lower priority is limited to
statutory adjudications. Id. at 347-48, 599 P.2d at 660-61, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 354 (dictum).
Thus, the federal government arguably could claim unexercised riparian rights on federal lands
in piecemeal adjudications and retain its priority. The California Supreme Court, however,
has expressed a policy that statutory adjudication is a preferred method of resolving disputes.
Id.
175. In fact, the federal government had conceded that its rights were unexercised. 44
Cal. 3d at 455, 746 P.2d at 326, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 889.
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that beneficial use continues. 176 The doctrine of prior appropriation de-
veloped from the assumption that the federal government eventually
would dispose of its vast holdings of land in the West, including those
that it had withdrawn from the public domain, and that, in the interim, it
would claim no water rights. 177 This policy of disposition of federal
lands, however, "has given way to a new policy of retention and manage-
ment."'178 Many think that the existence of reserved rights, which have a
priority date relating back to the original withdrawal of lands from the
public domain, 179 undermines the basic assumption upon which many
Westerners made their appropriations and renders property rights
uncertain. 8 0
A closer examination, however, renders this argument specious.
Unlike appropriative rights, which are quantified pursuant to a permit,
reserved rights are not amenable to immediate quantification. They are
not, however, wholly inchoate in nature. Any user who fears that federal
reserved water rights will undermine the user's water claim may petition
the court to quantify that federally reserved right.' 81 The amount of the
federal water right would be the quantity the court deems necessary to
accomplish the primary purposes of the reservation.
The real uncertainty concerning reserved rights lies in the scope of
the doctrine and when it is to be applied. Despite the confusion concern-
ing the federal reserved rights doctrine, Congress has been reluctant to
specify the extent of these rights and the correlative duties of the federal
government to assert them. The power of Congress to reserve water for
federal land is firmly established, 1 2 but politicians generally have been
unwilling to address frankly this highly controversial issue.
Congress should aim to clarify the purposes of reserved land so that
courts can give effect to congressional intent when they assess water
rights claims. This legislation should make clear that federal reserved
water rights are available to fulfill all the purposes for which the land has
been reserved. It also should clarify the intended impact of congressional
176. Regarding the usufructuary nature of the right, see Fairfax & Tarlock, supra note 59,
at 511-14.
177. Id. at 511.
178. Trelease, supra note 41, at 757.
179. See supra note 29.
180. For a discussion of the historical assumptions of Western water users, see Fairfax &
Tarlock, supra note 59, at 511-14.
181. The McCarran Amendment, 43 U.S.C. § 666 (1985), waived federal immunity from
general adjudication to quantify water rights. The United States Supreme Court has inter-
preted the amendment as requiring quantification in a state proceeding and has voiced a pref-
erence that the proceeding be conducted in state court. Colorado River Water Conservation
Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976). For a discussion of the Colorado River case, see
Abrams, Reserved Water Rights, Indian Rights and the Narrowing Scope of Federal Jurisdic-
tion: The Colorado River Decision, 30 STAN. L. REv. 1111 (1978).
182. See supra notes 19-24 and accompanying text.
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land management statutes-particularly MUSYA and the National Wil-
derness Act--on federal water rights. Furthermore, this legislation ex-
pressly should direct the land management agencies to assert reserved
rights claims when failing to assert claims adversely affects future federal
claims to those rights. Although this is not an inclusive list of issues that
Congress should address, it provides the framework for developing a
comprehensive approach to preserving instream values on federally re-
served land.
First, the legislation should provide that federal reserved water
rights exist to the extent necessary to fulfill all stated purposes of any
reservation of land unless Congress expressly provides otherwise. This
provision would eliminate the "primary purposes" inquiry established by
the Court in New Mexico, 18 3 obviating the need for judicial conjecture
with respect to whether purposes are primary or secondary.
Second, Congress should enact a provision declaring that MUSYA
expanded the purposes for which National Forests are to be adminis-
tered184 and reserved water rights to the extent necessary to accomplish
the purposes expressed in the Act. Congress also should clarify the pri-
ority dates for such reserved rights by providing that Forest Service lands
reserved prior to the 1960 enactment of MUSYA will have a priority
date set at the date of the enactment of MUSYA. The priority date for
water purposes expressed in the Organic Administration Act of 1897 and
the Creative Act of 1891 will relate back to the time of the initial reserva-
tion.'8 5 For Forest Service lands reserved after the enactment of
MUSYA, the priority date for all reserved rights will be the date the land
is reserved.
If adopted, this proposed provision would resolve the issue left open
by the Supreme Court in New Mexico, whether MUSYA created reserved
water rights with a 1960 priority date on National Forest lands reserved
prior to MUSYA's enactment.186 Based on its reading of New Mexico,
the Colorado Supreme Court in Denver concluded that the Act did not
create such rights.'8 7 MUSYA, however, does express additional pur-
poses for National Forest lands, including "watershed, and wildlife and
fish purposes.' 88 Logically, additional water is required to accomplish
these purposes. This proposal recognizes this need and would make re-
served rights available for the purposes articulated in MUSYA. The pro-
posed priority dates for water for MUSYA purposes on pre-1960
183. See supra text accompanying notes 58-59.
184. In 16 U.S.C. § 528 (1985), Congress provides that "national forests are established
and shall be administered for outdoor recreation, range, timber, watershed, and wildlife and
fish purposes."
185. See supra notes 56-62 and accompanying text.
186. United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 715 n.22 (1978).
187. See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
188. 16 U.S.C. § 528 (1985).
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reservations would protect users who acted in reliance on the law as it
existed before MUSYA.
Third, Congress should clarify that inclusion of lands in the Na-
tional Wilderness Preservation System, pursuant to the Wilderness Act
of 1964, constitutes a "new" reservation of land, which gives rise to fed-
eral reserved water rights necessary to accomplish the purposes ex-
pressed in the Act. This provision would resolve the important questions
surrounding wilderness reserved rights 18 9 Congressional action on this
matter is particularly important because it would ensure that reserved
rights are available for any BLM lands included in the National Wilder-
ness System. 190
Finally, Congress should provide that the assertion of federal re-
served water rights by the secretary of the managing agency is the pre-
ferred method for ensuring that sufficient water is available to
accomplish the purposes of the reservation. The agency should be obli-
gated to assert such rights in adjudications that may affect the availabil-
ity of water for such purposes.191 This measure would create a
mandatory rather than discretionary duty of affected agencies to assert
reserved rights. Significantly, it would enable the courts to order the as-
sertion of reserved rights if, like the government agency in the Sierra
Club cases, federal agencies are reluctant to pursue reserved rights
claims.
The proposed congressional action would not be popular among
those Westerners who jealously guard their water rights to maximize
their own uses. From a political viewpoint, such a measure would be
extremely difficult to enact. From a public policy viewpoint, however, it
would provide a sensible and fair means of conserving the water on feder-
ally reserved lands.
Conclusion
Congressional action to clarify the application of reserved water
rights to federal lands is merely a starting point. The proposed legisla-
tion would be useful only for reserved lands. Beyond this, Congress must
be aware of the need for water in undertaking future preservation efforts.
To ensure that reserved water rights are available, Congress must distin-
guish whether it is withdrawing land from the public domain or merely
directing its use. The MUSYA and Wilderness Act discussions in Part II
189. See supra notes 100-34 and accompanying text.
190. See supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text.
191. This duty should extend to water rights adjudications of streams off reserved lands if
the outcome of the adjudication would affect the availability of water necessary to fulfill the
purposes of the reservation of land. For example, if the adjudication involves water rights
upstream from reserved land, the federal government's water rights on the reserved land may
be affected, and the government should have a duty to assert its rights.
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of this Note illustrate that when congressional intent is unclear, the
courts and the federal land management agencies generally will err on
the side of finding that no reservation of land was intended and no re-
served water rights exist. Congress must take the responsibility-as well
as the political heat-for providing water for the lands it deems special
enough to withdraw from the public domain.
These lands are reserved to preserve them in a natural state for the
enjoyment of current and future generations. They are set aside by the
federal government for the public's benefit so that they will not be
usurped by individuals with parochial interests. States, on the other
hand, are at the mercy of local needs and cannot be expected to protect
adequately the unique values of these lands. Similarly, state water laws
cannot be relied upon to provide the water necessary to fulfill the pur-
poses of federally reserved land. If the water on these lands is not con-
currently reserved, federal protection of the land is illusory. Water is,
after all, an integral part of the package Congress seeks to protect.
